Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification
检验了代理成本对企业多元化的解释，发现多元化程度与管理者及外部大股东的股权持有负相关，且多元化减少与外部控制威胁、财务困境和管理层更替相关，表明代理问题导致企业维持减值的多元化策略。
We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.