Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
研究了连续时间道德风险模型中多任务情境下的最优项目选择，分析了激励扭曲和项目选择的动态变化，发现相对于净现值标准会出现过度投资或投资不足，并设计了包含股权、奖金和个人账户的最优合约。
I study the optimal choice of projects in a continuous‐time moral hazard model with multitasking. I characterize the distortions caused by moral hazard and the dynamics of the firm's project choice. Both overinvestment and underinvestment relative to a net present value (NPV) criterion can occur on the path of the contract. As past performance increases, the firm chooses projects that require higher pay–performance sensitivity. When the continuation value is large, investment projects are chosen more efficiently, and project choice depends more on the NPV and less on the incentive costs. I implement the optimal contract with an equity stake, bonus payments, and a personal account.