Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
利用一家企业的员工面板数据，研究个人是否基于预期的道德风险行为选择保险计划，发现存在异质性道德风险及其选择效应，并指出忽略这种选择会高估高免赔额保险对支出的削减效果。
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral (“moral hazard”) response to insurance, a phenomenon we label “selection on moral hazard.” Using a model of plan choice and medical utilization, we present evidence of heterogenous moral hazard as well as selection on it, and explore some of its implications. For example, we show that, at least in our context, abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead to overestimates of the spending reduction associated with introducing a high-deductible health insurance option.