Collective Self-Control
研究了在政府决策受选民偏好影响的政治过程中，针对时间不一致性问题的集体行动（如承诺和消费时机）的福利效果，发现完全集权或自由放任的福利最高，而仅对消费决策进行集体行动无法产生承诺效果。
Behavioral economics presents a “paternalistic” rationale for a benevolent government's intervention. We consider an economy where the only “distortion” is agents' time-inconsistency. We study the desirability of various forms of collective action, ones pertaining to costly commitment and ones pertaining to the timing of consumption, when government decisions respond to voters' preferences via the political process. Three messages emerge. First, welfare is highest under either full centralization or laissez-faire. Second, introducing collective action only on consumption decisions yields no commitment. Last, individuals' relative preferences for commitment may reverse depending on whether future consumption decisions are centralized or not.