Political Determinants of Competition in the Mobile Telecommunication Industry
研究移动运营商董事会中的政客与电信监管规则的关系，发现政客关联越深，竞争促进规则越少，且竞争规则能降低价格和集中度，不损害质量或就业，表明政治关联是一种寻租行为。
Abstract We study the relationship between the presence of politicians on mobile service operators’ boards and the regulation of the mobile telecommunication sector. In countries in which mobile operators have deeper connections with local politicians, we find that rules promote competition less, even after we control for country fixed effects and a country’s level of corruption. Rules that promote competition are associated with lower concentration and lower prices. There is no evidence that procompetition rules are associated with worse quality, lower investments, less employment, or lower wages. Thus, all the evidence points to political connections being a form of rent-seeking.