Agency and Internal Capital Market Inefficiency: Evidence from Banking Organizations
利用银行数据，研究发现公开交易的银行控股公司内部资本配置效率低于非公开交易公司，表明CEO与股东利益分歧是内部资本错配的重要来源。
Using banking data, I provide evidence that agency problems are at the root of internal capital market inefficiency. I find that publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs) are less efficient in their internal capital allocation than nonpublicly traded BHCs. This suggests that the divergence of interests between the chief executive officer and the shareholders is an important source of the internal capital misallocation. I also demonstrate that BHCs incorporating a tiered organizational structure are less efficient than nontiered BHCs, but only within a sample of BHCs that are publicly traded. These findings imply that a greater degree of rent‐seeking activity by division managers contributes to internal capital market inefficiency only if the top manager is an agent. This is consistent with theoretical models that explain internal capital misallocations through the multiple layers of agency within an organization.