Why Do Bank Runs Look Like Panic? A New Explanation
证明即使储户完全理性且总是选择帕累托最优均衡，当关于银行基本面的预期不变时，银行挤兑仍可能发生，原因在于储户得知将披露或不会披露有噪音的银行特定信息。
This paper demonstrates that, even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the Pareto‐dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria, a bank run may still occur when depositors' expectations on the bank's fundamentals do not change. More specifically, a bank run may occur when depositors learn that noisy bank‐specific information will be revealed, or when they learn that precise bank‐specific information will not be revealed. The results in this paper are consistent with the empirical evidence about bank runs. It also implies that suspension of convertibility can improve the efficiency of bank runs.