SHAREHOLDERS' UNANIMITY WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS*
研究在不完全市场中，股东对公司最优投资计划的分歧问题。模型显示，当生产函数规模报酬不变且借贷约束不紧时，股东对投资水平达成一致；否则，受约束的股东偏好更高投资。
When markets are incomplete, shareholders typically disagree on the firm's optimal investment plan. This article studies the shareholders' preferences with respect to the firm's investment in a model with aggregate risk, incomplete markets and heterogeneous households who trade in firms' shares instead of directly accumulating physical capital. If the production function exhibits constant returns to scale and borrowing limits are not binding, a firm's shareholders unanimously agree on its optimal level of investment. In contrast, with binding borrowing constraints, constrained shareholders prefer a higher level of investment than unconstrained ones.