Promoting a reputation for quality
模型研究企业投资产品质量并影响质量披露的策略，发现促销在低声誉时有助于重建声誉，但在高声望时挤出了其他信息源带来的投资激励，导致声誉周期。
Abstract I model a firm that invests in the quality of its product and influences how that quality is disclosed. The firm can promote its product; at random intervals it can disclose quality for a cost. At low reputations, promotion allows a firm to reestablish itself and the firm invests to take advantage of this. However, the ability to promote crowds out incentives for investment at high reputations generated by other information sources, in particular information that is generated whenever the firm is selling a low quality product, leading to reputation cycles in settings where high reputations would have otherwise persisted.