Two-Sided Investment and Matching with Multidimensional Cost Types and Attributes
研究了异质性买卖双方在进入连续赋值市场前进行投资的情形，发现无技术多重性可保证每对投资有效，但错配仍可能发生；利用最优运输理论表明，在特定多维环境中错配受到严格限制。
Heterogeneous buyers and sellers must make investments before entering a continuum assignment market. I show that efficient ex post contracting equilibria (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001b) exist in a general assignment game framework. I then shed light on what enables and what precludes coordination failures. A simple condition—absence of technological multiplicity—guarantees efficient investments for each pair, but a mismatch of agents may still occur. However, using optimal transport theory, I also show that mismatch is heavily constrained in certain multidimensional environments with differentiated agents and no technological multiplicity. Under technological multiplicity, even extreme ex ante heterogeneity need not preclude inefficiencies.