PRODUCT BUNDLING AND INCENTIVES FOR MERGERS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
研究了企业通过并购或战略联盟捆绑互补产品的选择，发现若捆绑目的不是排挤对手，企业更倾向联盟而非并购，因为并购会加剧竞争。
This paper analyzes firms' choice of a merger or a strategic alliance in bundling their products with other complementary products. Tying two products of unequal value makes them equally valuable as they become inseparable for purchase. Consequently, firms can charge a higher price for the bundled products than before. If foreclosure is not the main purpose of bundling, firms would prefer strategic alliances to mergers because mergers only intensify competition by internalizing the complementarities of two products. In equilibrium, bundling occurs only through strategic alliances .