The fundamental Coase of development: property rights foundations of the effective state
提出政治产权和管辖权竞争是驱动政治经济发展的两个重要机制，通过分析中世纪西欧、文艺复兴意大利和近代德国的历史案例，论证了良好的政治产权和治理竞争能促进有效国家、抑制掠夺型国家。
Abstract This paper identifies political property rights and jurisdictional rivalry as two important mechanisms that drive political and economic development. After developing a general framework to explain relative performance in the ‘market for governance’, we argue that Western Europe during the High Middle Ages presented initial conditions conducive to the development of effective states. We extend the framework by analyzing city-state governance in Renaissance Italy, as well as public finance practices in early modern Germany. We conclude by discussing the implications of our argument for the literature on state capacity and economic development. The takeaway is that well-aligned political property rights and competition in the provision of governance services can promote the protective and productive state while forestalling the predatory state.