Property–Liability Insurer Reserve Error: Motive, Manipulation, or Mistake
研究了财务弱保险公司准备金不足的证据，质疑了为逃避偿付能力监管而操纵准备金的结论，并发现保险公司为税务目的和应对监管费率压制而增加准备金。
Abstract We use two reserve error definitions found in the literature to investigate the joint impact of previously studied incentives on the magnitude of reserve error. We find many prior conclusions are dependent upon the restricted setting in which the hypotheses are tested and on the definition of the reserve error. We find strong evidence that financially weak insurers underreserve to a greater extent than other insurers. However, our evidence casts doubt on the conclusion that insurers manipulate reserves to avoid solvency monitoring. We also find insurers increase reserves for tax purposes and to reduce the impact of regulatory rate suppression.