Open-End Organizational Structures and Limits to Arbitrage
研究发现开放式组织结构削弱了资产管理人纠正长期错误定价的动机，与封闭式基金相比，开放式基金买入被低估股票更少，尤其当套利风险高时。
We provide evidence that open-end organizational structures undermine incentives for asset managers to attack long-term mispricing. We compare open-end funds with closed-end funds. Closed-end funds purchase more underpriced stocks than do open-end funds, especially if the stocks involve high arbitrage risk. We then show that hedge funds with highshare restrictions having a lower degree of open-endedness also trade against long-term mispricing to a larger extentthan do other hedge funds. Our analysis suggests that open-end organizational structures are not conducive to long-term risky arbitrage. Received November 4, 2015; editorial decision March 10, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.