How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants
利用断点回归设计，发现债务契约违约后债权人通过威胁加速贷款干预管理层，导致资本投资急剧下降，且该效应在代理问题和信息问题更严重时更显著。
ABSTRACT We identify a specific channel (debt covenants) and the corresponding mechanism (transfer of control rights) through which financing frictions impact corporate investment. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that capital investment declines sharply following a financial covenant violation, when creditors use the threat of accelerating the loan to intervene in management. Further, the reduction in investment is concentrated in situations in which agency and information problems are relatively more severe, highlighting how the state‐contingent allocation of control rights can help mitigate investment distortions arising from financing frictions.