Electoral competition with costly policy changes: A dynamic perspective
研究两党在无限期界中，面对政策变更成本和随机负面冲击时的选举竞争，发现均衡策略导致政策在长期内随机交替，且成本有缓和作用但无法完全收敛到中间选民位置。
We analyze two-party electoral competition with a one-dimensional policy space, costly policy changes, and random negative shocks to a party's viability (e.g., a scandal) over an infinite horizon. We show the existence and uniqueness of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in which parties use so-called simple strategies. Regardless of the initial policy, party choices converge in the long run to a stochastic alternation between two policies, with transitions occurring if and only if parties suffer a negative shock to their viability. Although costs of change have a moderating effect on policies, full convergence to the median voter position does not take place when parties are polarized.