论国家的起源:刚果东部的固定强盗与税收

On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo

Journal of Political Economy · 2019
被引 240 · 同刊同年前 7%
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究刚果东部武装组织如何因资源冲击而建立类似国家的税收和行政体系,并发现这反而提升了当地福利。

Abstract

A positive demand shock for coltan, a mineral whose bulky output cannot be concealed, leads armed actors to create illicit customs and provide protection at coltan mines, where they settle as “stationary bandits.” A similar shock for gold, easy to conceal, leads to stationary bandits in the villages where income from gold is spent, where they introduce illicit mining visas, taxes, and administrations. Having a stationary bandit from a militia or the Congolese army increases welfare. These findings suggest that armed actors may create “essential functions of a state” to better expropriate, which, depending on their goals, can increase welfare.

国家起源固定匪帮税收刚果东部