How Management Risk Affects Corporate Debt
研究发现，管理层更替时管理风险最高，导致信用违约互换、贷款和债券利差上升，并在新CEO上任头三年内下降，表明管理风险影响公司违约风险和债务定价。
We evaluate whether management risk, which arises from investors’ uncertainty about management’s added value, affects firms’ default risks and debt pricing. We find that, regardless of the reason for the turnover, CDS, loan, and bond yield spreads increase at the time of management turnover, when management risk is highest, and decline over the first three years of the new CEO’s tenure. The effects increase with prior investor uncertainty about the new management. These results are consistent with the view that management risk affects firms’ default risk. An understanding of management risk yields a number of implications for corporate finance. Received May 15, 2016; editorial decision February 27, 2017 by Editor David Denis.