Money in the Equilibrium of Banking1
研究了货币作为交易媒介和银行最流动资产的双重角色，发现市场均衡中银行因道德风险过度投资非流动资产，迫使央行低息提供流动性，而事前流动性覆盖率要求可实现约束有效配置。
Abstract Money is both the medium for transaction and the most liquid asset for banks. We examine both roles of money in an integrated framework, where banks are subject to aggregate illiquidity risk. An active central bank can replicate the constrained efficient allocation, which, however, cannot be implemented in the market equilibrium: due to moral hazard problems, banks invest excessively in illiquid assets, forcing the central bank to provide liquidity at low interest rates. An interest rate policy aiming to reduce systemic liquidity risk is dynamically inconsistent. Instead, the constrained efficiency can be achieved by imposing ex ante liquidity coverage requirement.