Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes
构建并估计了一个劳动力市场均衡模型，其中低效员工因信息不对称和道德风险而被系统淘汰，导致从未被解雇者的工资随任期增长，即使没有长期合同。
The author develops and estimates an equilibrium model of the labor market in which inefficient employees are systematically eliminated from the sector of the market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard. Systematic selection on the distribution of productivity characteristics produces wage sequences which are increasing in tenure for employees never previously terminated even in the absence of long-term contracting between employees and individual firms. The author provides sufficient conditions for there to exist an unique termination-contract type equilibrium and he estimates the equilibrium model using micro-level data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)