Minority Shareholders' Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural Experiment from China
利用中国2004年要求股权融资提案需经少数股东单独投票批准的法规，研究发现该法规阻止了共同基金持股高的公司管理层提交损害价值的提案，且少数股东更可能否决此类提案，表明少数股东控制权效果取决于其构成。
ABSTRACT Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to obtain the separate approval of voting minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions helps to reduce value-decreasing corporate decisions for firms domiciled in weak investor protection countries. We find that the regulation deters management from submitting value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership. There is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto value-decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that in weak investor protection countries, the effect of granting minority shareholders increased control over corporate decisions on the quality of corporate decisions depends on the composition of minority shareholders. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; G38