Blockholder Heterogeneity, CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance
研究了不同类型大股东（如共同基金、对冲基金）在监督CEO薪酬方面的差异，发现积极监督的大股东更可能提高CEO薪酬中的股权部分，且在被动监督效果差时，积极监督能提升公司运营绩效。
This paper examines heterogeneity in blockholder monitoring across investor types. We document which blockholder types (e.g., mutual funds, hedge funds) are more likely to be associated with active monitoring and show that firms targeted by such blockholders are more likely to increase the equity portion of chief executive officer (CEO) pay. Further, using market-wide and exogenous shocks to liquidity to identify differences in efficacy across blockholder types, we observe greater operating-performance improvements in actively monitored firms when passive monitoring is less effective, suggesting causal impact. We propose differences in compensation arrangements across blockholder types as a mechanism underlying blockholders’ heterogeneous role.