价格水平目标制与通胀目标制:免费的午餐?

Price-Level Targeting versus Inflation Targeting: A Free Lunch?

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · 1999
被引 322 · 同刊同年前 9%
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

比较了价格水平目标制和通胀目标制在承诺和相机抉择下的表现,发现当失业具有持续性时,价格水平目标制在相机抉择下能降低通胀波动并消除通胀偏差,可能比通胀目标制更优。

Abstract

Price-level targeting (without base drift) and inflation targeting (with base drift) are compared under commitment and discretion, with persistence in unemployment. Price-level targeting is often said to imply more short-run inflation variability and thereby more employment variability than inflation targeting. Counter to this conventional wisdom, under discretion a price-level target results in lower inflation variability than an inflation target (if unemployment is at least moderately persistent). A price-level target also eliminates the inflation bias under discretion and, as is well known, reduces long-term price variability. Society may be better off assigning a price-level target to the central bank even if its preferences correspond to inflation targeting. A price-level target thus appears to have more advantages than commonly acknowledged.

价格水平目标通胀目标相机抉择承诺