Pension Fund Asset Allocation and Liability Discount Rates
研究美国公共养老金基金的独特监管规则如何激励其投资更多风险资产以改善资金状况，并与加拿大和欧洲的公共及私人基金比较，发现美国公共基金的风险承担行为与绩效负相关。
The unique regulation of U.S. public pension funds links their liability discount rate to the expected return on assets, which gives them incentives to invest more in risky assets in order to report a better funding status. Comparing public and private pension funds in the United States, Canada, and Europe, we find that U.S. public pension funds act on their regulatory incentives. U.S. public pension funds with a higher level of underfunding per participant, as well as funds with more politicians and elected plan participants serving on the board, take more risk and use higher discount rates. The increased risk-taking by U.S. public funds is negatively related to their performance.