Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation
研究最优管理层薪酬如何减少关于经理报告目标的不确定性，发现公司允许高操纵倾向的经理获得更高强度、更短期的股权激励，这可能导致更多操纵但未必提高利润。
ABSTRACT This paper studies the role of optimal managerial compensation in reducing uncertainty about manager reporting objectives. It is shown that, paradoxically, firm owners allow managers with higher propensity to manipulate the short‐term stock price to push for higher powered and more short‐term‐focused equity incentives. Such managers also work harder, and manipulate more, but may not generate higher firm profits. The model is consistent with existing empirical findings about the relationship between manipulation and equity pay, suggesting that heterogeneity in manager manipulation propensities may be an important driver of heterogeneity in pay. Novel testable predictions are developed.