Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy
利用微观数据发现，有孩子的年轻家庭对成人死亡风险保障不足，通过包含人力资本风险、年龄相关投资回报和有限合同执行的宏观模型解释了这一现象，并预测破产改革将增加信贷和保险量。
We use microdata to show that young households with children are underinsured against the risk that an adult member of the household dies. This empirical finding can be explained by a macroeconomic model with human capital risk, age-dependent returns to human capital investment, and endogenous borrowing constraints due to limited contract enforcement. When calibrated, the model quantitatively accounts for the observed life-cycle variation in life insurance holdings, financial wealth, earnings, and consumption inequality. The model also predicts that reforms making consumer bankruptcy more costly will substantially increase the volume of both credit and insurance.