Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings
构建了一个信号模型，解释高质量公司为何在IPO时抑价，以便在后续成熟发行中获得更高价格。模型假设低质量公司需投入模仿成本伪装成高质量，且模仿可能被发现，从而抑价信号能迫使低质量公司自愿暴露真实质量。
This paper presents a signalling model in which high-quality firms underprice at the initial public offering (IPO) in order to obtain a higher price at a seasoned offering. The main assumptions are that low-quality firms must invest in imitation expenses to appear to be high-quality firms, and that with some probability this imitation is discovered between offerings. Underpricing by high-quality firms at the IPO can then add sufficient signalling costs to these imitation expenses to induce low-quality firms to reveal their quality voluntarily. The model is consistent with several documented empirical regularities and offers new testable implications. In addition, the paper provides empirical evidence that many firms raise substantial amounts of additional equity capital in the years after their IPO.