Access to Collateral and the Democratization of Credit: France's Reform of the Napoleonic Security Code
法国2006年改革废除了拿破仑法典中的占有所有权概念，使企业更容易质押实物资产。改革后，小型、年轻和融资受限的企业借贷显著增加，创业公司杠杆率提高且破产率下降，农村地区信贷不平等得到缓解。
ABSTRACT France's Ordonnance 2006‐346 repudiated the notion of possessory ownership in the Napoleonic Code, easing the pledge of physical assets in a country where credit was highly concentrated. A differences‐test strategy shows that firms operating newly pledgeable assets significantly increased their borrowing following the reform. Small, young, and financially constrained businesses benefitted the most, observing improved credit access and real‐side outcomes. Start‐ups emerged with higher “at‐inception” leverage, located farther from large cities, with more assets‐in‐place than before. Their exit and bankruptcy rates declined. Spatial analyses show that the reform reached firms in rural areas, reducing credit access inequality across France's countryside.