Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting
利用俄罗斯地区月度面板数据检验机会主义政治周期理论，发现预算周期显著且短暂，公共支出偏向直接货币转移，且周期幅度随民主程度、政府透明度、媒体自由和选民意识提高而减小，选举前操纵增加连任机会。
This paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade-old democracy—Russia—finds strong evidence of cycles, and provides an explanation for why previous literature often found weaker evidence. Using regional monthly panel data, we find that (1) the budget cycle is sizable and short-lived; public spending shifts toward direct monetary transfers to voters; (2) the magnitude of the cycle decreases with democracy, government transparency, media freedom, voter awareness, and over time; and (3) preelectoral manipulation increases incumbents' chances for reelection. The short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by previous literature because of low frequency data used in previous studies.