The Electric Gini: Income Redistribution through Energy Prices
研究了监管机构如何通过调整电力定价（降低固定月费、提高每度电价）来影响收入再分配，并构建了“电力基尼系数”衡量这种再分配程度，发现美国电力公司虽在实践中有此倾向，但电价与收入关联弱，并非有效的再分配工具。
In theory, regulators concerned about inequality will deviate from efficient two-part tariffs, charging lower-than-efficient fixed monthly fees and higher-than-efficient per-kilowatt-hour prices. To quantify that relationship, we develop a measure of the redistributive extent of utility tariffs: the “electric Gini.” Utilities with higher electric Ginis shift more costs from households using relatively little electricity to households using more. In practice, US utilities whose ratepayers have more unequal incomes have higher electric Ginis. But electricity demand is only loosely correlated with income, which means that electricity prices are an indirect and ineffective policy for countering income inequality.