信息设计:一个统一的视角

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Journal of Economic Literature · 2019
被引 496
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

从字面和隐喻两种角度解释信息设计,展示其如何统一沟通、贝叶斯说服等现有研究,帮助分析不同信息结构下的博弈行为。

Abstract

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information.

信息设计贝叶斯说服不完全信息博弈信息结构