On the "Receiver-Pays" Principle
扩展了电信运营商网络竞争理论，考虑接收方从接听电话中获得剩余并影响通话时长，研究接收方收费能否内化呼叫外部性，发现当接收方收费和接入费都受规制时存在有效均衡，且需要终止折扣。
This paper extends the theory of network competition between telecommunications operators by allowing receivers to derive a surplus from receiving calls (call externality) and to afiect the volume of communications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate the extent to which receiver charges can lead to an internalization of the calling externality. When the receiver charge and the termination (access) charge are both regulated, there exists an e‐cient equilibrium. E‐ciency requires a termination discount.