School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance
研究了学生偏好相互依赖且信息不对称时，常用延迟接受机制不再防策略、结果不稳定且可能损害信息较少学生，但适当设计优先级可恢复良好性质。
We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy‐proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse off. We attribute these results to a curse of acceptance . However, we also show that if priorities are designed appropriately, positive results are recovered: equilibrium strategies are simple, the outcome is stable, and less informed students are protected from the curse of acceptance. Our results have implications for the current debate over priority design in school choice.