The Optimal Concentration of Creditors
模型分析债权人集中度对债务追偿成本、管理层抵抗支出及社会福利的影响，发现集中债权人追偿效率更高但社会浪费更大，优质企业倾向选择集中债权人并支付更高预期收益。
ABSTRACT Our model assumes that creditors need to expend resources to collect on claims. Consequently, because diffuse creditors suffer from mutual free‐riding ( Holmstrom (1982) ), they fare worse than concentrated creditors (e.g., a house bank). The model predicts that measures of debt concentration relate positively to creditors' (aggregate) debt collection expenditures and positively to management's chosen expenditures to resist paying. However, collection activity is purely redistributive, so social waste is larger when creditors are concentrated. If borrower quality is not known, the best firms choose the most concentrated creditors and pay higher expected yields.