Collusion and the Organization of the Firm
研究了生产人员与审计人员合谋的威胁如何影响企业的组织决策，包括外包和成本分配，发现最优应对是让员工在无监督的外部工作或有监督的内部工作之间选择，均衡时合谋无租金且高效员工在外部工作。
This paper shows that the threat of collusion between a productive agent and the auditor in charge of monitoring production can influence a number of organizational dimensions of the firm, including outsourcing decisions and the allocation of production costs. We find that the optimal organizational response to internal collusion lets the agent choose between working outside the firm with no monitoring, or working within the firm with monitoring. In equilibrium, there are no rents due to collusion and the efficient worker works outside the firm. The results are robust to a number of extensions.