A Theory of Soft Capture
提出一种基于利益趋同而非互惠的监管捕获模型，分析企业提供低成本信号如何使监管者节省信息成本，同时企业获得更高信息租金。
Abstract In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents.