Coercive Trade Policy
研究一国政府如何通过强制性手段影响另一国的贸易行为，发现单边强制可能因信号传递问题而无效，而通过国际组织争端解决机制则更易促成合规。
Coercion is used by one government (the “sender”) to influence the trade practices of another (the “target”). We build a two-country trade model in which coercion can be exercised unilaterally or channeled through a “weak” international organization without enforcement powers. We show that unilateral coercion may be ineffective because signaling incentives lead the sender to demand a concession so substantial to make it unacceptable to the target. If the sender can instead commit to the international organization’s dispute settlement mechanism, then compliance is more likely because the latter places a cap on the sender’s incentives to signal its resolve.