Career Concerns, Inaction and Market Inefficiency: Evidence From Utility Regulation
研究职业担忧如何导致监管公用事业中的代理人避免高价值但可能带来坏结果的行为，从而减少市场交易，并用天然气市场数据验证了这一预测。
We study how incentive conflicts known as ‘career concerns’ can generate inefficiencies not only within firms but also in market outcomes. Career concerns may lead agents to avoid actions that, while value‐increasing in expectation, could potentially be associated with a bad outcome. We apply this theory to natural gas procurement by regulated public utilities and show that career concerns may lead to a reduction in surplus‐increasing market transactions during periods when the benefits of trade are likely to be greatest. We show that data from natural gas markets are consistent with this prediction and difficult to explain using alternative theories.