Bank Skin in the Game and Loan Contract Design: Evidence from Covenant-Lite Loans
研究了银行在贷款中保留的风险份额与贷款条款严格程度之间的曲棍球棒关系，发现银行持股比例低时条款更严格，但低于阈值后条款反而放松、利率上升，对理解贷款合同设计有参考价值。
Abstract In a model of dual-agency problems where borrower–lender and bank–nonbank incentives may conflict, we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness. As bank participation declines, covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold, at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in spread. We find support for the hockey stick relation with bank’s stake in covenant-lite loans averaging 8% (0% median). We also find that covenant-lite loans are more likely when borrower moral hazard is less severe and when bank relationship rents are high.