Initial Public Offering Allocations, Price Support, and Secondary Investors
研究了首次公开发行中通过配售与二级市场购买挂钩进行价格支持的现象，发现这种操纵行为损害了二级市场投资者回报，并分析了相关投资者的行为变化。
Tying initial public offering (IPO) allocations to after-listing purchases of other IPO shares as a form of price support has generated much theoretical interest and media attention. Price support is price manipulation and can reduce secondary investor return. In the past, obtaining data to investigate price support has proven to be difficult. I document that price support is harming secondary investor return using new data from the Oslo Stock Exchange. I also show that investors who engage in price support are allocated more future oversubscribed allocations, whereas harmed secondary investors significantly reduce their future participation in the secondary market.