The dark side of individual blockholder philanthropy
研究了上市公司个人大股东进行慈善捐赠的市场反应，发现这种捐赠可能削弱股东对财富最大化的偏好，导致代理成本上升，最终降低公司价值和薪酬业绩敏感性。
Abstract We examine the market reaction to charitable pledges by individual blockholders of public firms. As this philanthropy may signal a weakening preference for wealth maximization and may be indicative of distraction or relaxed monitoring, these agency costs may overwhelm any reputation benefits. We find decreased firm value and lower pay‐for‐performance sensitivity, the effects of which are most severe where monitoring needs are high, the blockholder is a director, or when the firm has ex ante high corporate social responsibility ratings. Our results are robust to controlling for prior charitable foundation involvement, busy director–blockholders, dual‐class share structures, blockholder exit, and pre‐pledge firm sentiment.