Can Paying “Too Much” or “Too Little” Tax Contribute to Forced CEO Turnover?
研究企业税收结果对CEO被迫离职的影响，发现低税负和高税负都会增加CEO被迫离职的可能性，表明存在个人声誉成本。
ABSTRACT Our study examines the effect of corporate tax outcomes on forced CEO turnover. While prior research argues that firms often do not engage in tax avoidance due to reputational concerns, the empirical evidence suggesting the existence of reputational costs is scarce. In a broad sample of firms, we find evidence of a relation between the payment of low taxes and forced turnover. We also find that forced CEO turnover is more likely when the firm pays a high tax rate relative to its peers. Our results are consistent with the existence of previously unexplored individual reputational costs for not engaging in tax avoidance. JEL Classifications: M40; H25.