Chain interdependencies, measurement problems and efficient governance structure: cooperatives versus publicly listed firms
研究了在何种情况下，合作社（非上市公司）比上市公司更有效，通过多任务委托代理模型发现，当上游边际产出与链条互补性强度的增函数之积大于下游边际产出时，合作社是唯一有效的治理结构。
We determine the circumstances when the absence of public listing, often believed to be a disadvantage, makes a cooperative the unique efficient governance structure. This is established in a multi-task principal–agent model, capturing that cooperatives are not publicly listed and their CEOs have to bring the downstream enterprise to value as well as to serve upstream member interests. Not having a public listing prevents the CEO from choosing the level of the downstream activities too high. Cooperatives are uniquely efficient when the upstream marginal product multiplied with a function increasing in the strength of the chain complementarities is higher than the downstream marginal product.