Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan
研究日本银行因自身避免损失而向最弱企业提供额外信贷的逆向激励，导致信贷错配，尤其对资本充足率接近最低要求的银行更为明显。
We examine the misallocation of credit in Japan associated with the perverse incentives faced by banks to provide additional credit to the weakest firms. Firms are more likely to receive additional bank credit if they are in poor financial condition, because troubled Japanese banks have an incentive to allocate credit to severely impaired borrowers in order to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets. This “evergreening” behavior is more prevalent among banks that have reported capital ratios close to the required minimum, and is compounded by the incentives arising from extensive corporate affiliations.