Governance through Trading: Institutional Swing Trades and Subsequent Firm Performance
利用独特的每日基金经理交易数据，研究发现多个机构投资者的短期摇摆交易（如买卖卖）能有效约束公司管理层，提升股价信息含量，并带来后续的公司业绩改善。
Abstract Using unique daily fund-manager trade data, we examine the role of institutional trading in influencing firm performance. We show that short-horizon informed trading by multiple institutional investors effectively disciplines corporate management. Our focus is on short-term “swing” trades, sequences with three phases (e.g., buy-sell-buy). We find swing trades increase stock price informativeness, are profitable after costs, and improve market efficiency. This increase in stock price informativeness is associated with subsequent firm outperformance. Trades are most beneficial with optimal stock holdings that reflect the information acquisition incentives of investors as well as liquidity costs.