Intertemporal Pricing and Consumer Stockpiling
作者研究了一类消费模式稳定的产品（如日用品、主食）的动态定价问题。消费者可能以当前价格囤货以备未来消费，但需承担库存持有成本。作者将这一情境建模为无限时间范围内的动态博弈：每个时期，卖家设定价格，每个消费者决定购买数量。基于理性预期，作者为每个参与者赋予信念，将动态博弈解耦为每个参与者的独立动态规划，并求解理性预期均衡，所有参与者在正确预判他人行为的前提下做出最优动态决策。均衡中，卖家可能收取固定价格，也可能在可预测的时间间隔内进行周期性促销。作者发现，当频繁购物者比偶尔购物者愿意支付更高价格时，促销是有利的。此外，作者还扩展了模型，研究消费者囤货对卖家库存、生产和配给策略的影响。
We study a dynamic pricing problem for a class of products with stable consumption patterns (e.g., household items, staple foods). Consumers may stock up the product at current prices for future consumption, but they incur inventory holding costs. We model this situation as a dynamic game over an infinite time horizon: in each period, the seller sets a price, and each consumer chooses how many units to buy. We develop a solution methodology based on rational expectations. By endowing each player with beliefs, we decouple the dynamic game into individual dynamic programs for each player. We solve for the rational expectations equilibrium, where all players make optimal dynamic decisions given correct beliefs about others' behavior. In equilibrium, the seller may either charge a constant fixed price or offer periodic price promotions at predictable time intervals. We show that promotions are useful when frequent shoppers are willing to pay more for the product than are occasional shoppers. We also develop several model extensions to study the impact of consumer stockpiling on the seller's inventory, production, and rationing strategies.