Optimal Team Composition: Diversity to Foster Implicit Team Incentives
研究委托人如何选择异质（多样）或同质（专业）团队进行重复生产，发现多样团队更有利于成员间隐性合作，而专业团队可能引发隐性合谋，并分析折现因子对薪酬的影响。
We study optimal team design. In our model, a principal assigns either heterogeneous agents to a team (a diverse team) or homogenous agents to a team (a specialized team) to perform repeated team production. We assume that specialized teams exhibit a productive substitutability (e.g., interchangeable efforts with decreasing returns to total effort), whereas diverse teams exhibit a productive complementarity (e.g., cross-functional teams). Diverse teams have an inherent advantage in fostering desirable implicit/relational incentives that team members can provide to each other (tacit cooperation). In contrast, specialization both complicates the provision of cooperative incentives by altering the punishment agents can impose on each other for short expected career horizons and fosters undesirable implicit incentives (tacit collusion) for long expected horizons. As a result, expected compensation is first decreasing and then increasing in the discount factor for specialized teams, while expected compensation is always decreasing in the discount factor for diverse teams. We use our results to develop empirical implications about the association between team tenure and team composition, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and team culture. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.