Market Effects of Recognition and Disclosure
通过模型分析发现，会计金额的确认与披露通过影响三个信息源（确认金额、披露信息、价格揭示信息）的交互作用以及会计专业知识的获取，进而影响价格信息含量。研究表明，仅基于可靠性做确认决策过于简单，可靠性相对于相关性的权衡才是关键。
Abstract Our recognition and disclosure model reveals that price informativeness is determined by the interaction of the qualities of three information sources—the recognized amount, the disclosed information, and the information revealed by price—and accounting expertise acquisition. It also reveals that recognition of an accounting amount alters each of these, thereby affecting price informativeness. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that recognition of a highly unreliable accounting amount, rather than simply disclosing it, can result in greater price informativeness. Likewise, recognition of a highly reliable amount can result in lower price informativeness. Our findings suggest that, because of the effects of aggregation, basing recognition decisions on reliability alone is too simplistic. Reliability relative to relevance is key, not reliability per se. We also find that recognition and disclosure affect the coefficients in a regression of price on accounting amounts.