Pay for Performance and Corporate Governance Reform
通过元回归分析英国所有可比的绩效薪酬估计值，发现董事薪酬与公司绩效之间几乎没有有意义的关联，但过去的“遵守或解释”规则（尤其是卡德伯里报告）曾有效，其效果随时间减弱。
Directors’ pay and corporate governance continue to generate public outrage and calls for reform. Our meta‐regression analysis of all comparable UK pay‐for‐performance estimates finds little, if any, meaningful association between directors’ pay and corporate performance. However, there is evidence of the effectiveness of past “comply‐or‐explain” rules, especially the Cadbury Report. Unfortunately, the effects of past reform efforts tend to erode over time. This study also explores differences between pay–performance estimates, finding that these are largely explained by how pay and performance are measured by a given study.