LYING ABOUT WHAT YOUKNOWOR ABOUT WHAT YOUDO?
通过一次性两人公共品博弈实验，比较了知情者谈论回报与谈论贡献时撒谎频率的差异，发现谈论贡献时撒谎更少，因为其中包含承诺成分。
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player’s contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-ride depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less—and thereby lies less frequently—when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-ride and less lying.